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Abstract. The channel capacity of a deterministic system with confidential data is
an upper bound on the amount of bits of data an attacker can learn from the system.
We encode all possible attacks to a system using a probabilistic specification, an
Interval Markov Chain. Then the channel capacity computation reduces to finding
a model of a specification with highest entropy.
Entropy maximization for probabilistic process specifications has not been studied
before, even though it is well known in Bayesian inference for discrete distributions.
We give a characterization of global entropy of a process as a reward function, a
polynomial algorithm to verify the existence of an system maximizing entropy
among those respecting a specification, a procedure for the maximization of
reward functions over Interval Markov Chains and its application to synthesize an
implementation maximizing entropy.
We show how to use Interval Markov Chains to model abstractions of deterministic
systems with confidential data, and use the above results to compute their channel
capacity. These results are a foundation for ongoing work on computing channel
capacity for abstractions of programs derived from code.
1 Introduction
Quantified Information Flow [7] is a quantitative approach to compute the number of
bits of information an attacker would gain about the confidential data of a system by
interacting with the system and observing its behavior.
Leakage is defined as the difference between the attacker’s information [18] about the
confidential data before and after the attack. If we view the system as a channel through
which the attacker gets information about the secret, its capacity can be computed as
the maximum leakage over all prior infromations of attackers. This provides a security
guarantee for the system, as no attack can leak an amount of information higher than the
system’s channel capacity [16]. For a deterministic system, the leakage is the entropy
of the observable behavior of the system [14], and thus computing the channel capacity
reduces to computing the behavior of the system that maximizes entropy.
Our goal is to develop theories and algorithms to synthesize the process with maxi-
mum entropy among all those respecting a given probabilistic specification, allowing us
to give a security guarantee valid for all the infinite processes respecting the specification.
We use Markov chains (MCs) as process models and Interval Markov Chains (Interval
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MCs) [12] as specification models. We use the continuity of the real-valued intervals
to encode the infinite number of possible attackers and implementations we want to
consider.
In the theoretical sense, in this paper we extend the well know Maximum Entropy
Principle of Jaynes [11], from constraints on probability distributions to interval con-
straints on discrete probabilistic processes. We consider Interval MCs as constraints
over probabilistic processes and resolve them for maximum entropy. As a result we
validate the intuition that channel capacity computation as known in security research
corresponds to obtaining least biased solutions in Bayesian inference for processes.
Given a deterministic protocol specified as an Interval MC, we show how to:
1. Compute the entropy of a given implementation. We provide a polynomial-time
procedure to compute entropy for a Markov chain, by reduction to computation of
the Expected Total Reward [17, Chpt. 5] of a local non-negative reward function
associated with states over the infinite horizon.
2. Check if a protocol allows for insecure implementations. We provide a polynomial-
time procedure for deciding finiteness and boundedness of the entropy of all im-
plementations of an Interval MC. In general a Maximum Entropy implementation
might not exist. Implementations might be non-terminating and accumulate infi-
nite entropy, or they may have arbitrarily high, i.e. unbounded, finite entropy, so
standard optimization techniques would diverge. In such case it is not possible to
give a security guarantee for the implementations. We provide a polynomial-time
algorithm to distinguish the two cases. If a protocol allows implementations with
infinite or unbounded entropy then no matter the size n of the secret, it will have
an implementation leaking all n bits of it. We detect this so that the designer can
strengthen the protocol design appropriately.
3. Compute channel capacity of a protocol. This is a multidimensional nonlinear maxi-
mization problem on convex sets [19]. We use a numerical procedure for synthesizing
with arbitrary approximation an implementation maximizing a reward function over
Interval MCs. An Interval MC can be considered as an infinite set of processes, and
since entropy is a nonlinear function of all possible behaviors of a system, finding
the one with highest entropy is not trivial. We apply this procedure to synthesize
a Maximum Entropy process implementing an Interval MC; the entropy of such
process is the channel capacity of all processes implementing the Interval MC.
Motivating Examples. Consider two examples of models of deterministic authentication
processes. Figure 1a presents a specification of a two-step authentication protocol. A
user is requested to input a username, and is rejected if the username is unknown. If it is
correct the user is asked to input a password, and is accepted if the password corresponds
to the username and rejected otherwise. The actual transition probabilities will depend
on how many usernames exist in the system, on the respective passwords, on their length
and on the attacker’s knowledge about all of these. Staying at the specification level
allows us to consider the worst case of all these possible combinations, and thus gives an
upper bound on the leakage. The Maximum Entropy implementation for the Two-step
Authentication is given in Fig. 2. Its entropy is the channel capacity of the system over
all possible prior informations and behaviors of the attacker and design choices.
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Consider another example. Figure 1b presents
an Interval MC specification of the Repeated Au-
thentication protocol. A user inserts a password to
authenticate, and is allowed access if the password
is correct. If not, the system verifies if the pass-
word entered is in a known black list of common
passwords, in which case it rejects the user, con-
sidering it a malicious attacker. If the password is
wrong but not black listed the user is allowed to try
again. The black list cannot cover more than 90% of the possible selection of passwords.
Note that the transition probabilities from state 2 depend on a design choice left
to the implementer of the system and on the attacker’s knowledge about it, while the
transition probabilities from state 1 depend on the length of the password and the
attacker’s knowledge about it. By abstracting these different sources of nondeterminism
at the same time we maximize entropy over all possible combinations of design choices
and attackers, effectively finding the channel capacity of the specification.
Implementations with higher entropy reveal more information about the system’s
secret. This is consistent with our intuition. For instance, in the example in Fig 1b
decreasing the black list, which decreases probability of reject, increases the possible
information leakage. If the black list is empty the user can continue guessing the password
indefinitely: the probability of eventually reaching state 3 is 1. In this implementation
sooner or later the attacker will discover the password, and thus the system’s secret will
be completely revealed. So, a larger black list increases the chance that the system will
enter the absorbing state 4 and leak less information, and symmetrically a smaller black
list increases the leakage.
In fact, it is not possible to give a Maximum Entropy implementation for such
protocol. Whatever is the length n of the secret, it is possible to give an implementation
that leaks all n bits of information. We show how these undesirable cases can be
recognized in polynomial time and how the specification can be modified to avoid them.
Figure 3bc shows two implementations of the Repeated Authentication presented in
Fig. 3a. None of them maximizes entropy. In fact, it is not possible to give a Maximum
Entropy implementation for such protocol. We will discuss the significance of this in
Sect. 6. The Maximum Entropy implementation for the Two-step Authentication is given
in Fig. 2. We explain how it has been synthesized in Sect. 5.
Related Work. Channel capacity as a security guarantee [16] has been studied for many
different models of computation. Chatzikokolakis, Palamidessi and Panangaden use it
to give a formula for anonymity analysis of protocols described by weakly symmetric
matrices [4], based on the probabilistic anonymity approach by Bhargava and Palamidessi
[1]. Chen and Malacaria generalize this result to asymmetric protocols [6] and also study
the channel capacity of deterministic systems under different observation models [15].
Our method, unlike theirs, handles infinite classes of models instead of single models,
and uses different states of a Markov chain to represent the different logical states of the
system instead of considering the system as a function from inputs to outputs.
2 Background on Probabilistic Processes
Definition 1. A triple C = (S, s0, P ) is a Markov Chain (MC), if S is a finite set of
states containing the initial state s0 and P is an |S| × |S| probability transition matrix,
so ∀s, t∈S. Ps,t≥0 and ∀s∈S.
∑
t∈S Ps,t = 1.
We slightly abuse the notation, interpreting states as natural numbers and indexing
matrices with state names. This is reflected in figures by labeling of states both with
textual descriptions and numbers.
A state is deterministic if it has exactly one outgoing transition with probability 1,
stochastic otherwise. It is known [8] that the probability of transitioning from any state s
to a state t in k steps can be found as the entry of index (s, t) in P k. We call pi(k) the
probability distribution vector over S at time k and pi(k)s the probability of visiting the
state s at time k; note that pi(k) = pi0P k, where pi
(0)
s is 1 if s = s0 and 0 otherwise. A
state t is reachable from a state s if ∃k.P ks,t > 0. We assume that all states are reachable
from s0 in the MCs considered. A subset R ⊆ S is strongly connected if for each pair
of states s, t ∈ R, t is reachable from s. Let ξs denote the residence time in a state s:
ξs =
∑∞
n=0 P
n
s0,s.
For the purpose of defining entropy, it is useful to consider the alternative, less
automata-theoretical but more probabilistic, view of an MC. An MC can be seen as an
infinite sequence of discrete random variables (Xn, n ∈ N), where P(Xk = s) = pi(k)s
represents the probability that the chain will be visiting state s ∈ S at time k. The
processes must respect the Markov property: P (Xn = sn | Xn−1 = sn−1, . . . , X0 =
s0)=P (Xn = sn | Xn−1 = sn−1), ∀s0, s1, ..., sn ∈ S, n ∈ N.
A state s is recurrent iff ξs =∞, transient otherwise. Residence time of each state
of an MC can be calculated in polynomial time [17].
Usage of Markov chains to model generic secret-dependent processes has been
previously introduced by the authors [2], including ways to automatically generate them
from imperative program code. Each state of the MC represents a reachable combination
of values of the public variables of the system and levels of knowledge about the private
variables. We refer to [2] for the full discussion.
Definition 2. [3] A closed-interval Interval Markov Chain (Interval MC) is a tuple
I = (S, s0, Pˇ , Pˆ ) where S is a finite set of states containing the initial state s0, Pˇ is an
|S| × |S| bottom transition probability matrix, Pˆ is a |S| × |S| top transition probability
matrix, such that for each pair of states s, t ∈ S we have Pˇs,t ≤ Pˆs,t.
a)
0.3
0.7
1
2
3
4try
reject
1
wrong0.2
0.8
accept
1
b)
0.3
0.7
1
2
3
4try
reject
1
wrong0.01
0.99
accept
1
Fig. 3. a) Correct implementation of the Repeated Authentication. b) Incorrect implementation of
the Repeated Authentication.
The following defines when an MC implements an Interval MC in the Uncertain
Markov Chain (UMC) semantics [3]:
Definition 3. A Markov chain C = (S, s0, P ) implements an Interval Markov Chain
I = (S, s0, Pˇ , Pˆ ), written C  I, if ∀s, t ∈ S. Pˇs,t ≤ Ps,t ≤ Pˆs,t.
An example of an Interval MC is the Repeated Authentication of Fig. 1b. The MC in
Fig. 3a uses a black list with 80% of the passwords and is thus an implementation of the
Interval MC, while the Markov chain in Figure 3b uses a black list with 99% and it is
not an implementation of the Interval MC.
We assume that our Interval MCs are coherent, meaning that every value for each
transition interval is attained by some implementation. Coherence can be established by
checking that both following conditions hold [13]:
1) ∀s, t ∈ S.Pˇs,t ≥ (1−
∑
u6=t Pˆs,u) 2) ∀s, t ∈ S.Pˆs,t ≤ (1−
∑
u6=t Pˇs,u)
Assuming coherence is not a limitation. If an Interval MC I = (S, s0, Pˇ , Pˆ ) is not
coherent it can be made coherent in polynomial time [13]; we produce the coherent
Interval MC I ′ = (S, s0, Pˇ ′, Pˆ ′) by changing the top and bottom transition probability
matrices to the following:
1) Pˇ ′s,t = max(Pˇs,t, 1−
∑
u6=t Pˆs,u) 2) Pˆ
′
s,t = min(Pˆs,t, 1−
∑
u 6=t Pˇs,u)
The resulting coherent Interval MC I ′ is unique and has the same implementations
as the original incoherent Interval MC I [13], so in particular it has an implementation
iff I has at least one implementation.
A state s of an Interval MC is deterministic if ∃t. Pˇs,t = 1, stochastic otherwise.
We say that a state t is reachable from a state s if ∃s1, s2, ..., sn ∈ S.s1 = s ∧ sn =
t ∧ Pˆsi,si+1 > 0 for 1 ≤ i < n. We say that a subset R ⊆ S is strongly connected if
∀s, t ∈ R. t is reachable from s.
Note that if there is an implementation in which a subset of states R ⊆ S is strongly
connected, then R must be strongly connected in the Interval MC.
We often refer to deterministic, stochastic and nondeterministic behavior. We use the
adjective deterministic for a completely predictable behavior, stochastic for a behavior
that follows a probability distribution over some possible choices, and nondeterministic
for a choice where no probability distribution is given.
3 Entropy of Processes and Specifications
The entropy of a discrete probability distribution quantifies lack of information about the
events involved. This idea can be extended to quantify nondeterminism, understood as
degree of unpredictability of an MC. For a discrete set of n events (x1, ..., xn) entropy
is defined as −∑ni=1P(xi) log2(P(xi)) and is maximal for the uniform distribution,
in which case its value is log2 n [8]. For MCs, entropy is maximum for the process in
which all possible paths in the chain have the same probability.
To define the entropy of a Markov chain C we need to introduce the concepts
of conditional entropy and joint entropy [18, 8]. Conditional entropy quantifies the
remaining entropy of a variable Y given that the value of other random variables (Xi
here) is known.
H(Y | X1, . . . , Xn) = −
∑
t∈S
∑
s1∈S
· · ·
∑
sn∈S
P(Y = t,X1 = s1, . . . , Xn = sn) ·
· log2P(Y = t | X1 = s1, . . . , Xn = sn) ,
where P(Y = t,X1 = s1, . . . , Xn = sn) denotes the joint probability of the events
Y = t, X1 = s1, . . . , Xn = sn.
Joint entropy is simply the entropy of several random variables computed jointly, i.e.
the combined uncertainty due to the ignorance of n random variable. It turns out [8] that
joint entropy can be calculated in the following way, using conditional entropy, which
will be instrumental in our developments for MCs.
H(X0, X1, . . . , Xn) = −
∑
s0∈S
∑
s1∈S
· · ·
∑
sn∈S
P(X0 = s0, X1 = s1, . . . , Xn = sn) ·
· log2(P(X0 = s0, X1 = s1, . . . , Xn = sn)) =
= H(X0) +H(X1 | X0) + · · ·+H(Xn | X0, X1, . . . , Xn−1)
Now, the definition of entropy of an MC is unsurprising, if we take the view of the
processes as a series of random variables; it is the joint entropy of these variables (recall
that due to the Markov property, the automata-view, and the probabilistic view of MCs
are interchangeable):
Definition 4. We define the entropy of a Markov chain C = (Xn, n ∈ N) as the joint
entropy over all Xn: H(C) = H(X0, X1, X2, . . . ) =
∑∞
i=0H (Xi |Xi−1 . . . X0 ).
Note that since we have assumed a single starting state in each MC, it is always the
case that H(X0) = 0. Also the above series always converges to a real number, or to
infinity, since it is a sum of non-negative real numbers.
In leakage analysis, entropy corresponds to the information leakage of the system
only when the system is deterministic and the attacker cannot interact with it [14]. Using
probability intervals we can lift the latter restriction, as different distributions on the
attacker’s input would only lead to different transition probabilities, and the intervals
already consider all possible transition probabilities.
The entropy of an MC is in general infinite; we will give a characterization in
Corollary 1 in the next Section showing that the entropy of an MC is finite if and only
if the chain is absorbing. Considering only absorbing MCs avoids the problem of the
entropy of an MC being in general infinite. We always consider terminating protocols,
and they can be encoded as absorbing MCs where the absorbing states represent the
termination of the protocol; consequently the entropy of a Markov chain encoding a
terminating process is always finite.
We stress that it is common [18, 10, 5] to compute the average entropy of each step
of the MC and to call it the entropy of the MC, while it’s technically an entropy rate [8].
Even though entropy rate is always finite, we want to compute the actual entropy since it
represents the information leakage in a security scenario where the states of the MC are
the observables of a deterministic program.
An alternative characterization of entropy of a process depends explicitly on which
states get visited during the lifetime of the process. Since every state s has a probability
distribution over the next state we can compute the entropy of that distribution, which we
will call local entropy L(s) of s: L(s) = H(Xk+1 | Xk = s) = −
∑
t∈S Ps,t log2 Ps,t.
Note that L(s) ≤ log2(|S|). Also the value of entropy of an MC is in general not equal
to the sum of the local entropy values for each state. Such sum will have to be weighted
against the residence time of each state to characterize the “global” entropy.
Now consider the Interval MC specification of the Repeated Authentication in
Fig. 1b. Different implementations of it, like the ones in Fig. 3ab, will have different
entropy values. We define a Maximum Entropy implementation for an Interval MC,
as an implementation MC, which has entropy not smaller than entropy of any other
implementation (if such exists). The boundedness and synthesis of the Maximum Entropy
implementation of an Interval MC will be treated in Sect. 5. It may be that the maximum
entropy is actually infinite, or that the set of attainable entropies is unbounded; we
discuss these cases in Sect. 6.
4 Computing Entropy of Markov Chains
We now provide an algorithm for computing entropy of a given MC. We cast entropy
as a non-negative reward function on an MC, and then apply standard techniques to
compute it. We also provide a simple decision procedure for deciding whether entropy
of an MC is finite.
A non-negative reward function over the transitions of an MC is a function R :
S × S → R+ assigning a non-negative real value, called reward, to each transition.
Given a reward function R we can compute the value of the reward for a concrete
execution of an MC by summing reward values for the transitions exercised in the
execution. More interestingly, we can compute the expected reward of each state s ∈ S
as R(s) =
∑
t∈S Ps,tRs,t, and then the expected reward over the infinite behavior of an
MC C is R(C) =∑s∈S R(s)ξs [17, Chpt. 5].
Each R(s) can be computed in time linear in the number of states, so calculation
of expected rewards for all states can be done in quadratic time. Since computing the
residence time for a state s is in PTIME, we can also compute R(C) in polynomial time.
Let the reward function be R(s, t) = − log2 Ps,t. Then the expected reward for each
state is its local entropy, or R(s) = −∑t∈S Ps,t log2 Ps,t = L(s). Note that this is an
unorthodox non-negative reward function, since it depends on the choice of probability
distribution, as a function of the form R : S×S×P → R+. It turns out that the (global)
entropy of the MC is the expected reward with this reward:
Theorem 1. For an MC C = (S, s0, P ) we have that H(C) =
∑
s∈S L(s)ξs
As any other reward of this kind, the entropy of an MC can be infinite. Intuitively,
the entropy is finite if it almost surely stops increasing. This happens if the execution is
eventually confined to a set of states with zero local entropy (deterministic). Since the
recurrent states of a chain are exactly the ones that are visited infinitely often, we obtain
the following characterization:
Corollary 1. The entropy H(C) of a chain C is finite iff the local entropy of all its
recurrent states is zero.
The above observation gives us an algorithmic characterization of finiteness of entropy
for MCs: the entropy of a chain is finite if and only if the chain has one or more absorbing
states or absorbs into closed deterministic cycles. Entropy can only be infinite for infinite
behaviors; for the first n execution steps the entropy is bounded by n log2 |S|.
We can classify the processes in two categories: those which eventually terminate
the stochastic behavior, and those which do not. Many processes become deterministic
(or even terminate) after some time. This is the case for a terminating algorithm like
a randomized primality test, or for randomized IP negotiation protocols like Zeroconf,
which stops behaving randomly as soon as an IP number is assigned. Such processes
have finite entropy. On the other hand, the processes that take probabilistic choices
forever and never become deterministic have infinite entropy. Using Corollary 1 we
characterize the processes having finite entropy as terminating and the processes having
infinite entropy as non-terminating.
5 Maximum Entropy Implementation of an Interval MC
Interval MCs describe infinite sets of MCs. We now show how to find an implementation
that maximizes entropy. Since our Markov chains represent the behavior of deterministic
processes, the Maximum Entropy implementation we synthesize is also the one with
maximum leakage, and its leakage is thus the channel capacity of all implementations.
In Fig. 2 we show the Maximum Entropy implementation of the Two-step Authenti-
cation specification in Fig. 1a. Its entropy of log2 3 ≈ 1.58496 bits. This allows us to
guarantee that none of the infinite possible implementations of the Two-step Authentica-
tion will leak more than log2 3 bits of information to any possible attacker.
Obtaining such an implementation is a challenging problem. In the first place, such an
implementation may not exist, so we need an algorithm to verify its existence. Secondly,
even if it exists finding it consist in solving a nonlinear optimization problem with
constraints over an infinite domain.
In this section we present a new algorithm that given an Interval MC I finds its
implementation, in the sense of Def. 3, that maximizes the entropy value. We propose a
numerical approach to the general problem of solving Interval MCs for non-negative
reward functions, and apply it to finding a Maximum Entropy implementation. We first
check that such an implementation exists, and then proceed to synthesize it. Remember
that an implementation maximizing the reward function R(s, t) = − log2(Ps,t) is a
Maximum Entropy implementation.
The expected reward of a non-negative reward function may be infinite. An Interval
MC admits implementations with infinite entropy if it has a state that can be recurrent
and stochastic in the same implementation. We call this the infinite case.
If an Interval MC has a state that is recurrent in some implementations and stochastic
in some others, but never both recurrent and stochastic in the same implementation,
the set of entropies of its implementations is unbounded, despite all the individual
implementations having finite entropy; an example is the Repeated Authentication in
Fig. 1b. We call this the unbounded case. This happens because the reward assigned to a
transition is not a constant, but a logarithmic function of the actual transition probability—
the logarithm is taken of the value that depends on the probability distribution of the
implementation. With such reward it is possible that the total reward value can be
unbounded across possible implementations (not just finite or infinite as for classical
non-negative rewards). Note that this does not happen with constant rewards, and is
specific to our problem.
5.1 Existence of a Maximum Entropy Implementation
We now show an algorithm for determining whether an Interval MC has a Maximum
Entropy implementation with finite entropy. To do this we first give a definition of end
components [9] for Interval MCs. Then we show the algorithm for deciding the existence
of a Maximum Entropy implementation.
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We propose a definition of an end component for
Interval MCs. An end component is a set of states
of the Interval MC for which there exists an imple-
mentation such that once the behavior enters the end
component it will stay inside it forever and choose all
transitions inside it an infinite number of times with
probability 1. We refer to [9] for further discussion.
For an Interval MC I = (S, s0, Pˇ , Pˆ ), R ⊆ S is
an end component of I then there is an implementa-
tion of I in which P(Xn+1 /∈ R | Xn ∈ R) = 0.
Definition 5. Given an Interval MC I = (S, s0, Pˇ , Pˆ ), a set of states R ⊆ S is an end
component of I if
1) R is strongly connected; 2) ∀s ∈ R, t ∈ S\R.Pˇs,t = 0; 3) ∀s ∈ R.
∑
u∈R Pˆs,u ≥ 1.
An end component is maximal if no other end component contains it. In the Inter-
val MC pictured in Fig. 4 we have that {1, 2} is an end component, {1, 3} is an end
component, and {1, 2, 3} and {4} are maximal end components.
The following algorithm finds all maximal end components of an Interval MC. It first
identifies all candidate end-components and their complement—the obviously transient
states; then it propagates transient states backwards to their predecessors who cannot
avoid reaching them. The predecessors are pruned from the candidate end-components
and the procedure is iterated until a fixed point is reached:
1. Tag all states of S as UNCHECKED
2. Find the strongly connected components (SCCs) of the Interval MC (e.g. with
Tarjan’s algorithm) and tag any state not in any SCC as TRANSIENT
3. For each SCC C:
(a) Select a state s ∈ C tagged UNCHECKED
(b) Check that ∀t ∈ S\C.Pˇs,t = 0. If not, remove s from C, tag it TRANSIENT, tag
UNCHECKED all states in C with a transition to s and go back to 3(a)
(c) Check that
∑
u∈C .Pˆs,u ≥ 1. If not, remove s from C, tag it TRANSIENT, tag
UNCHECKED all states in C with a transition to s and go back to 3(a)
(d) Tag s as ENDCOMPONENTSTATE
4. Until all states in any non-empty SCC are tagged as ENDCOMPONENTSTATE
Lemma 1. The algorithm above runs in polynomial time, and upon termination pre-
cisely the states that are part of any maximal end component are tagged as ENDCOMPO-
NENTSTATE, while the remaining states are tagged as TRANSIENT.
The algorithm to establish finiteness of maximum entropy across all implementations
of an Interval MC follows these steps:
1. Make the Interval MC coherent (see Sect.2)
2. Find the maximal end components of the Interval MC and call their union Sω
3. If there is a stochastic state in Sω , then no Maximum Entropy implementation exists.
After finding the maximal end components we check whether each end component
state in I is deterministic. Because the Interval MC is coherent, this check simply
amounts to verifying that for each state in each end component there is a successor state
with lower bound on transition probability being 1. If this is the case, then there exists a
Maximum Entropy implementation for I with a finite entropy value.
The following theorem states that the above approach to deciding existence of finite
maximum entropy implementation is sound and complete:
Theorem 2. Let I be an Interval MC and Sω the union of all its end components. Then
I has no Maximum Entropy implementation iff a state s ∈ Sω is stochastic.
5.2 Synthesis of a Maximum Entropy Implementation
We have been characterizing the existence of a Maximum Entropy implementation with
finite entropy, now we propose a numerical technique to synthesize it with an arbitrary
precision [19]; the Maximum Entropy implementation of the Two-step Authentication in
Fig. 2 has been obtained this way. We reduce the problem to solving a multidimensional
maximization on convex sets by considering each of the |S|2 transition probabilities
Ps,t in the chain as different dimensions, each of which can take values in the interval
[Pˇs,t, Pˆs,t], generating a convex polytope.
Due to coherence of the Interval MC there exists at least one Markov chain im-
plementing it, so the polytope will be nonempty. We need to add to the system the
constraints ∀s ∈ S.∑t∈S Ps,t = 1 to ensure every solution can be interpreted as a MC.
Since these constraints are linear, the domain is still a convex polytope. A point in the
polytope thus defines a Markov chain. The objective function to maximize is the entropy
of such Markov chain, which can be calculated in PTIME as shown in Sect. 4.
This optimization problem for an everywhere differentiable function can be solved
using numerical methods. Once the global maximum is found with a numerical algo-
rithm, the parameters Ps,t interpreted as a MC give a Maximum Entropy implementation.
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Fig. 5. a) Specification for the Repeated Authentication with unbounded entropy. b) Specification
for the Repeated Authentication with bounded entropy.
Example. Consider the Two-step Authentication in Fig. 1a. The entropy of the system
is H = (−(P1,2 log2(P1,2))− ((1−P1,2) log2(1−P1,2)))+P1,2(−(P2,4 log2(P2,4))−
((1−P2,4) log2(1−P2,4))) under constraints 0≤P1,2 ≤ 1 ∧ 0≤P2,4 ≤ 1. It is maximal
for P1,2 = 2/3, P2,4 = 0.5. The Maximum Entropy implementation is shown in Fig. 2.
6 Infinite vs Unbounded Entropy for Interval MCs
We now give insight about the difference between unbounded and infinite entropy for an
Interval MC and give a decision procedure to distinguish the two cases. The infinite case
means that it is possible to give non-terminating implementations, while the unbounded
case means that all implementations terminate but may leak the whole secret, and thus
we cannot give security guarantees for their behavior.
Consider the Repeated Authentication in Fig. 5a; since state 1 can be both recurrent
and stochastic but never both, we are in the unbounded case, and in fact it is possible
to give implementations with arbitrary entropy. Since the Repeated Authentication is
a security scenario, this means that it is possible to give implementations that leak any
amount of information about the confidential data, and thus this should be considered an
insecure authentication protocol, as it is not possible to give any security guarantee for it.
In this particular case this depends on the fact that we allow the black list to be
empty; in this implementation the attacker can try all possible passwords, and thus will
eventually leak all of the confidential data. In Figure 5b we show a modified version
in which the black list covers at least 30% of the passwords; for this case the Interval
MC has a Maximum Entropy implementation, and is thus possible to give a security
guarantee.
The idea to discriminate the two cases is to build an implementation that maximizes
the end components (in which all states that can be stochastic are stochastic). If this
implementation has stochastic states in a strongly connected component, then it will
be possible to generate an infinite amount of entropy, otherwise the entropy of any
implementation is always finite.
1. Find all maximal end components of the Interval MC
2. Modify the transition probabilities so that all end components are closed: for each
end componentR, set Pˆs,t = 0 for all s ∈ R, t /∈ R
3. Make the Interval MC coherent again with the coherence algorithm
4. If all states in all end components of the coherent Interval MC are deterministic,
then the original Interval MC does not allow infinite entropy implementations; else
it does.
After step 2 the Interval MC will still have implementations, since by the definition
of end components it’s possible to give an implementation that has probability 0 of
leaving the end component; we are just forcing it to happen for all our end components
and checking if this makes them necessarily deterministic or not.
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